All right, good morning. Thank you, everyone, for joining us at Primaris REIT's 2026 Investor Day at Promenades St-Bruno. This is a property that we acquired a year ago, this coming Saturday. I'm Alex Avery. I'm Primaris's Chief Executive Officer. Around the room, you will find a number of Primaris folks. Stéphane Landry is our head of operations for Central Canada. He's sitting on the right. Julie Morin is the General Manager for Promenades St-Bruno. I believe she's standing in the back. These lights are fairly bright. Then we've got quite a few other folks here. Patrick Sullivan, who will be presenting after me, our President and Chief Operating Officer. We've got Leslie Buist, who's SVP of Finance. Graham Procter, SVP of Asset Management. Julian Schonfeldt, right there, who is our Chief Investment Officer. Claire Mahaney, who puts all of our communications and investor relations stuff together, intimately involved in today. Nadia Markova, who is one of our really bright people helping us understand our own business, working on business intelligence, data management, and investment analytics. Then, of course, last night and today, we have Tim Pire, who is the Chair of our Board, one of our Trustees, and actively involved in our investor outreach that our board does each year. Actually, I think it's coming up, I would think, sometime soon. Louis Forbes, who is also on our board. He's the Chair of our Audit Committee, one-time former CFO of Primaris, and also intimately involved in our investor outreach. So we've got quite a few people here. We're going to spend a bunch of time together, and I would encourage anyone here to approach and chat with all of our team members and ask them any and all questions that you find interesting. So cautionary statements, we'll go right past that. The agenda, as I said, I'm going to set the stage for a few minutes. We're going to move on to Pat, and he's going to talk about our business, the operations, the management of shopping malls, and share a lot of the insights that he's particularly well-suited to sharing. We'll have a little Q&A after that because I think we find that investors and analysts find that topic particularly of interest, given that the mall business is experiencing strong growth, and there was a period of time when people didn't pay a lot of attention to malls. After that, we'll have a little bit of a break. Leslie's going to share a lot more about our differentiated financial model. Julian will talk about our investments and our investment strategy, and then I will wrap it up. So we'll have lunch after that. We'll tour the mall, and Pat's going to share some more specific to this shopping center after that. But if you look at where we stand today, this is Primaris by numbers. We have about CAD 5.6 billion worth of assets. That's up pretty sharply from about CAD 2.3 billion. That was prior to the spin-out. But even those numbers don't capture the full volume of activity. We've completed about CAD 4.4 billion of acquisitions and dispositions in the last five years. We've built a CAD 2 billion unsecured bond program. We've turned over, or about 70% of our portfolio is new since 2021. The portfolio quality has changed quite a bit, and we've done all of this while delivering some pretty attractive returns for our investors. Where it all started, and this is something that we review this slide with our board at each quarterly meeting. I'm not sure I've ever actually articulated this, but the reason that I go over it never changes, and it probably seems like we're just killing a bit of time in the board meeting. But I make sure to go over it each board meeting because it really is the pillars of our strategy. You've all seen it before, size and scale. We have a CAD 5.6 billion national portfolio of malls. That's important because in the mall business, it's a scale business for many reasons, relevance with retailers, having the internal management capability, access to capital. There's a lot of good reasons for size and scale. Proper capitalization, Leslie's going to talk later about our differentiated financial model. We harp on it, and I will harp on it a little bit more as well. Affordability. For our malls to do well, we need our retailers to do well, and we partner with our retailers to make sure that they're profitable, because when they're profitable, we're profitable. Scale and consolidation, this is something that just, I don't know if it was last week or the week before, we announced the Upper Canada Mall acquisition, the latest in a series of marquee acquisitions, which we're quite proud of, and we see more room for that type of activity in the future. Our disciplined capital allocation, Julian will speak more about that, but that is very key to our strategy. As I said, we talk about this every quarter at the board meeting because these are the pillars upon which Primaris is built. The portfolio construction, we've been very, very active, as you can see. Lots and lots of acquisitions. Fairly consistent pace. The number and dollar value has changed, but we've been pretty much in acquisition mode since the day that we spun out, even before the day that we spun out, and it has been fast and furious. We continue to have lots of opportunities, and I think as part of a proper disciplined capital allocation strategy, capital recycling is a critical part of that as well. When you look at all of this activity, we're not transacting just so that we can pay brokerage fees to all of the property brokers. We're doing it for very specific reasons, and at the heart of what we're trying to accomplish is we're trying to maximize the steady state run rate, same property NOI growth, in our portfolio. We're basically trying to increase that steady state growth rate. Right now, our best estimate, once we get through this next three-year period of leasing up to 96% or so percentage occupancy, we think our portfolio's gonna revert to about a 3%-4% same property NOI growth trajectory. In the period between now and then, we think we can probably do better than that as we're filling up vacant space. What that really requires in terms of getting that steady state maximum or optimal internal growth rate is you need to have market dominant shopping centers. We define that in a lot of ways, but at its simplest, what we are really talking about is malls that have the largest aggregate sales volume in the market. It is the place where the most retail transactions are taking place in the market, and what that means is that we are relevant to retailers because if a retailer is going to come into the market, they want to go to the place where the most retail sales takes place because that is where they are going to have the greatest volume, make the most money, and have the greatest access to consumers. Similarly, on the consumer side, they are going to come to our shopping centers because it is the place where they can find the most variety and options within their shopping needs. If you look at how this has translated into portfolio metrics, our aggregate sales on the left has risen from about CAD 1.7 billion to CAD 3.8 billion, which is 121% increase in the volume of retail sales that take place in our portfolio. Pretty substantial growth. Sales per square foot have risen from 589 in the line chart, 589 to 829. That is up 41%. We expect that number to continue to climb over time, in part because of further acquisitions, organic growth within our portfolio, and select dispositions. One of the really interesting metrics that we have not talked a lot about before, but I think really speaks to the market dominance of our portfolio, is the average mall CRU sales, so the average per mall of aggregate sales. Before the spinout, we were at CAD 74 million per mall. That is now CAD 151 million. That is up 104%. We have really shifted to being the dominant mall in the market, which in a lot of cases we already were, but we have now become the dominant mall in bigger markets with bigger trade areas and more sales volume, which again, really speaks to Primaris being relevant to retailers. Pat flew in late last night. Yesterday he was working with all of the retailers at the ICSC conference in Toronto, and I am sure he will share some details about that, but I think the punchline from last year's ICSC was that Primaris is very much the sought-after landlord. A lot of retailers that we had a relationship with are now more prioritizing that relationship. We have retailers that we did not have a relationship with that are now very interested in building a relationship with Primaris. These are our three-year targets that we published in September of 2024. What you will notice about them is all the way down the right, we have achieved or are on track to achieving all of those targets, even the ones sometimes we say on track, but we have actually exceeded the top end of the range. Like the first one, annual same property cash NOI growth, we were above the top end of the range. Later I am going to share the-- Well, it is already in the press release that went out this morning, but we will talk about the next three years. We blew through the acquisitions target, we blew through the dispositions target, and all of the other metrics we have been able to achieve. It is important that when we give guidance or give targets to the market that we actually deliver on them, and so I think the whole team is very proud of this slide and what it says about our ability to execute. And this chart. This is a funny slide. I think a lot of people have different reactions to it. A lot of our employees love this slide, and they love this slide because a lot of us get paid partially in stock. We also have a unit purchase loan program that is available to anyone in the company below the SVP level, where you can borrow up to CAD 100,000 non-recourse to buy units in Primaris. We have dozens of people throughout the organization, a lot of whom bought the stock a couple of years ago and have made a lot of money. They are very well-aligned with the Primaris story, and what is fantastic about that is when we have town halls, we get a lot more engagement from all parts of the company, lots of questions, and people are genuinely interested with this financial incentive that they have to understanding why our stock price goes up or why it goes down, what they are doing in their part of the business and how it contributes to the overall mission that we are on. Understandably, there is a lot of employees that really like this chart. I think when some analysts look at this, some investors look at this, they might have a thought of maybe this is a reversion to the mean story. The stock has performed tremendously in the first nine months of 2026, substantially outperforming all of our peers. We can talk about a lot of details there, but I think there are some people that look at it and say, "Big move. Show is over. Nothing to see. You can move along." When I look at this chart, I immediately get the urge to remind everyone that our stock is currently trading at a valuation that implies an 8% cap rate, which for the quality of the malls that we own, including the one that we are standing in, or sitting in right now, strikes me as a particularly high implied cap rate. I will note that that 8% implied cap rate is also reflective of 86.6% in place occupancy, which would suggest that our current valuation implies a stabilized cap rate somewhere north of a 9%. We have an interest rate tailwind. I could get into all sorts of things that, as the Chief Cheerleader at Primaris, I could tell you many great things about Primaris, but we will skip past that. One of the other things that I see in this chart is a superior business model. We have been talking about the differentiated financial model since day one. Low leverage and a low payout ratio and compounding the retained free cash flow provides a structurally higher growth rate on a per unit basis as compared to a higher leverage, higher payout ratio model. To frame that alternative, consider a REIT with high leverage and a high payout ratio. It becomes solely dependent on access to the equity markets to achieve growth, asset growth, create value, to be able to reinvest in the business above and beyond sort of the steady state. That is really, I think, where the per unit growth comes from, is having the flexibility to allocate capital, to have the ability to invest in acquisitions, developments, buy back stock. You need the financial flexibility to take advantage of all the opportunities that a REIT faces. When you have high leverage and a high payout ratio, interestingly enough, the only time that you have access to capital is when everybody else has access to capital. When everybody else has access to capital, and you have access to capital, everybody gets that capital, and then they go out and they compete for properties. If you're trying to acquire a property and there are 30 other bidders, you can be sure that the pricing is going to be optimized, you're going to pay for vacant space, you're going to have very limited flexibility to capture any value or create any value. When I think that the low leverage, low payout ratio model, we talk about it a lot of different ways, but I think that's one of the things. One of the ways to think about it is having capital that is available to you, essentially at all points in time, allows you to take advantage of opportunities that a lot of REITs that have higher leverage are unable to take advantage of. I don't really think there should be much debate on this point. If you go into other parts around the world, the U.S., Europe, Asia, Australia, the REITs with the lowest leverage and the lowest payout ratio have consistently delivered above average returns. I think Canada has been stubbornly stuck in the old model with the high payout ratio and high leverage. But we talk a lot about it, and I've harped about it probably enough for today. When I think about this chart, I don't think it's a one-time dynamic with our stock outperforming. I think our stock is structurally designed to deliver superior internal growth, superior per unit growth, and that's why we have both hardwired into our executive compensation a ceiling of 6x debt to EBITDA, and also aligned our executive compensation with relative total unit holder return. I think with that, I will stop talking about the differentiated financial model, which I could talk about all day, and I will turn it over to Pat, who is going to share a lot about the mall business. Pat? Thanks, Alex. Thanks everyone for coming today. We have a slide called Slide 4 in our investor deck that most of us usually cringe when we bring it up and talk about it. It starts from 2005 to basically going forward in terms of the evolution of the shopping center. I am old, so I am actually going to go back further than 2005 because I think it is relevant to explaining what I want to talk about today, which is the If I can get this thing to work. I want to talk about the transformation of the credit profile of the shopping center over the last 30 years, because it has actually been significant. To explain it, I think I need to go back into the '90s. I started in real estate in 1991 as a broker in Vancouver. Office rates were CAD 1 a foot in downtown Vancouver for office space. Sounds familiar to a couple of years ago. Shopping centers had just come out of a really, really bad time. The late '80s, early '90s, high interest rates. Companies went broke like Bramalea, Trizec, Daon. They had land banked, and they got caught with high interest rates and declining revenues. When you get further into the '90s, you had companies like Cambridge, Cadillac, Oxford, all were in financial trouble. Cadillac actually filed for bankruptcy and restructured. Cambridge didn't, but struggled to get through the '90s with their balance sheet intact. Along the way, you got recapitalization of those businesses by the pension funds. The pension funds started buying partial interest in malls before actually buying the entire company. The Caisse took over Cambridge and merged it with their other company, Ivanhoe. Ontario Teachers' took over Cadillac, and OMERS took over Oxford. During that same period of time, you had department stores that were starting to wane in basically their relevance. By the late '90s, you had Eaton's that had gone bankrupt for the most part, and was in the process of being replaced. Then you had Walmart coming to Canada and taking over Woolco and making it very clear that they had no intention of staying in shopping centers. The interesting dynamic as we go through that part and it couples with Sears and HBC starting to become less relevant with the consumer, is that you had a lot of sales migrate from the department store into the small shop space in the mall. In the '90s and into the early 2000s, you had a lot of locals and regionals in the shopping centers. We used to have every year we had merchandise meetings at the end of the year where all the tenants would gather. It would be a gala. The marketing manager would put on a big dinner, and you would explain what happened in the shopping center. There were so many locals in the mall that the room was full. That was their livelihood. So you had probably upwards of 50% of the mall tenants were locals. What happened when you had this migration of sales from the anchor tenants back into the shopping center, sales started going up. You had pension funds started buying into these assets and saying, "We want to reinvest in them." So they started making bigger investments. The small shop guys started realizing their sales were going up, rents were going up, too, and you had a lot of expansion going on. National tenants started expanding more. You had Gap come to Canada in the mid to late 1990s. That was the big first American coming up here and taking space. There was a lot of interest in shopping centers and expanding their footprint. Over time, you saw locals and regional tenants start to diminish. I remember, Louis might remember, we spent the first four or five years at Primaris having a slide where we talked about our percentage of waiting for locals and regionals versus nationals because it was a lot of concerned people in terms of the creditworthiness of the tenants we had. I go back as far as 2010 here, and you see our predominant tenants were HBC, Sears, Forzani Group, which by the way, I think went broke that year, and Canadian Tire bought them. Reitmans and Loblaws, I think is on this list simply because we owned a couple of power centers that had a bunch of large grocery stores. If you got below this line, you saw a lot more fashion tenants as well. There was a real concern for a long period of time, what was the creditworthiness of the mall look like? In fact, we got into years like 2011, where we had a significant year of bankruptcies, driven partially by the financial crisis of three years earlier, where you got through a period where these guys were hanging on, and then they finally threw in the towel. So we had a lot of bankruptcies in 2011. It cleared out a lot of space, but we had a lot of turnover in the shopping center. In 2015, when you had Target finally fail, we had an opportunity to reset our tenant mix, which we hadn't had before. After Target failed, the year after Target failed, mall sales went up. We hadn't replaced Target, but kind of going back in history, the sales go from the department store into the shopping center. Probably not 100%, but the shopping center picked it up. So you had CRU sales volume pick up. We replaced Target with necessities-based retailers such as grocery stores, pharmacies, but also fashion boxes like TJX and such forth, all of which were really strong covenant tenants, which was fantastic. If you go back 15, 20 years, malls have been kicking out grocery stores. They didn't think they were worthy of being in the shopping center. They wanted fashion. They thought they drove traffic to the grocery store, but not to the mall. People didn't do both. They didn't grocery shop and go to the shopping center. So they were shunned from the mall. But when Target left, we were all looking for large format tenants, and it made sense to add a grocery store. It's turned out to be a fabulous addition to the mall because people do cross-shop between grocery and the shopping center itself. What it does is it brings just more footfall in general to the mall. When Sears failed, similar story. Mall sales went up in the year after. We added more box stores. In the years following both Target and Sears, overall mall sales have climbed up significantly because we increased the regular footfall to the shopping center. We took a Target or a Sears that might have been, Sears was probably doing CAD 10 million, CAD 12 million at the time it failed, and Target might have been doing CAD 20 million. We replaced them with tenants that were probably doing CAD 50 million or CAD 60 million in aggregate. You had a significant number of people coming to the shopping center. You created a bigger retail destination node, and that in turn helped the CRU tenants in the mall as well. Over this time period, local and regional tenants got, A, priced out of the shopping center, B, there was so much demand from small shop tenants because sales were so buoyant that they wanted more and more space. More and more Americans were coming up here. Target kind of stalled that for a couple of years as there was a little apprehension. Why did Target fail? What was wrong with Canada? Nothing wrong with Canada. It was what was wrong with Target. Then we fast-forward, and then we have e-commerce start. With e-commerce, we had a lull in expansion with retailers. Did they need to add more stores? Surprisingly, the pandemic took care of that because people started to realize that stores. Tenants got through the pandemic realizing they needed e-commerce, but they made no money on it. When they had to rely on it basically for 100% of their sales, it was a real problem for them. They started to realize, "We need stores." So after the pandemic, they started opening stores. The example I use the most is Sephora. Pre-pandemic, we had a really hard time getting Sephora to expand into some of the secondary markets. Post-pandemic, they were like, "We need stores in all these markets." What they learned was when they added a store, their overall sales volume combined between e-commerce and their store itself went up. Now we have a proliferation of tenants wanting more stores because they need an omni-channel network. You are going to see going forward, if it already has not really started, tenants are starting to charge for deliveries. They are starting to charge for returns. They really want you to go to the store. They want you to pick it up in the store. They want you to return it in the store. They do not make money online. There are retailers that are abandoning e-commerce because they say, "What is the point of doing this if we are just losing money? We do not really need to be there. We are not going to try to compete with Amazon. They can have it. We have a very good business. We need to be profitable." They are abandoning that side of it. When we talk about mall sales and the impact of these boxes opening the malls, we always talk about all-store sales volume for the CRU. What we never really get into is the all-store sales volume for the shopping center itself, and there are two reasons for that. The primary reason is if you go back 20, 30, 40 years, the anchors did not report sales. You did not get numbers from HBC or Sears or Target, so you did not really know what their numbers were. I can tell you there were some Sears stores. Sears in Devonshire did CAD 60 million at one point. By the end, they were doing 10, and a lot of that migrated into the mall. These guys have fallen off significantly, but that is the primary reason we did not report a number with the bigger sales volume, and now it has just become kind of the standard norm that that is what we report on. If we talk about Promenades St-Bruno, Promenades St-Bruno here, we have a mall that is approaching CAD 300 million in CRU sales volume. There is probably another CAD 150 million done in the box stores, and that is without the Bay. When the Bay gets re-merchandised, my guess is we will grow that number by 10% and we will be up to CAD 500 million. That is a significant amount of footfall in the shopping center, is CAD 150 million goes into the box stores, which helps drive further traffic into the shopping center and feeds the CRU tenants. At the end of the day, you see where our merchandise mix has ended up. These tenants want to be in a retail center that drives the majority of sales in the region that it is in. You are starting to see Walmart want to come back to malls. We have announced two of them. There may be more. They want to be back in shopping centers. In 2003, 2004, they could not wait to get out of malls. They thought the ideal format for them, there is a free stand on the street with parking right in front. What they realized is the mall has so much activity, they can drive further sales and higher sales by going to the mall and being part of the shopping center. Whereas they used to buck having an entrance into the mall, they are now open to having an entrance into the mall. They want to feed off the traffic. Grocery stores, same thing. When we are going through this whole process with the Bay, and I will get into the Bay shortly, a lot of the box stores we are getting were not new to the market. They are just relocations from other centers in the area that want to upgrade their real estate to be in the dominant retail asset, and that is the kind of tenant we are attracting here, and that is why our merchandise mix and our tenant quality has morphed so drastically. We are getting the Walmarts, we are getting the grocery, we are getting TJX, we are getting high covenant tenants. Over the last 10 years, our fashion mix in the shopping center has diminished in terms of small shops. We used to run well over 30% fashion tenants, and we are into the low 20s now, and that was driven by adding TJX, adding H&M, adding Old Navy. There had to be an offset, corresponding offset with fashion, so we reduced the small shop fashion. We got rid of a lot of the smaller local tenants, regional tenants that were fashion-based. We have added a lot of more electronics. We have added a lot more of the health and beauty as well. Tenant mix has changed drastically. While there was some mall development in the 2000s with Ivanhoe building their Mills Concepts, Vaughan, CrossIron Mills, Niagara, and such forth, there has been very little. Population growth has grown significantly, but malls have not been developed. Retail space has not been built. Now as we get into today, it is really, really hard to rationalize building anything. It is going to cost CAD 1,000 a foot plus to build a shopping center, which means you need rents that no one is going to pay, so nothing is getting built. It has really become a key topic out there in the retail community because a lot of the smart retailers, like TJX, who were really not focused on major store expansion over the next 24 months. They got directed from the U.S. when the HBC went down that they needed to ramp up their store count in Canada. The reason was because I think there is a recognition this is the last large block of real estate you are going to find for years in Canada, and once it is gone, your expansion options will become very limited. There is a lot of retailers out there pushing hard, whether it is TJX, Canadian Tire, Walmart, grocery guys, they are all looking for space. I will get into HBC shortly, but there is a lot of activity with all of those big banners. Merchandise mix is a concept that we talk about a lot. It is essential for a shopping center. You have to continually bring in new brands, to keep the mall reinvigorated. We are never going to be 100% occupied. In all likelihood, we are always going to be holding some space to re-merchandise, because tenants come to malls for the brands. We always hear experiential, we hear entertainment, we hear add more restaurants and such forth. But the excitement when you open a new Abercrombie in a mall or a new lululemon or some of the brands that has just opened in here, UNIQLO has been opening stores. They get lineups in the mall when they first open that are 200 people long, and that is just the excitement over the brand. Entertainment is nice. It still comes back to, are you branding your shopping centers with the latest concepts? That is what people want, and that is what our primary focus is. Some of these tenants we are doing business with, there is a number of Americans, there is some food concepts out of the U.S. We are doing a lot of deals right now with Browns, expanding lululemons, La Vie en Rose expansions, Victoria's Secret, MINISO. On the power center side, we have announced some Walmarts, TJX, Canadian Tire banners. There is lots of activity with all these guys. I am really bad at following my speech with the slides, so I will try to keep up. When we talk about the drivers of our rent, it kind of fits into this, but the main drivers of our rent really comes from, there is the straightforward rent structure, where we lease space, we have a contractual rent, we build in rental escalations. It has migrated from 2% to 3%. Most retailers are now accepting 3% as the new 2%, aligning with inflation. Then we get into all the other ways we can diversify our revenue base beyond just straightforward rent that I do not think a lot of our retail peers operating in other kind of developments, whether it be power center, strip malls, have. Percentage rent is very much unique to a shopping center. It typically used to represent 1.5%-2% of our revenue. Right now it is 3%-4%, and that is driven primarily by the fact that there has been such significant inflation in prices. Sales have gone up. Retail space is not as plentiful as it used to be. There is a number of factors that have driven sales, but inflation certainly drove that, and that is what percentage rent was originally. The whole original concept of percentage rent was a hedge against inflation. You entered into these 10-year leases. How are you going to get rental escalations or capture the fact that sales might increase? The beauty of getting sales reported and getting percentage rent is we have visibility into their sales, and we can participate in the tenant's success throughout the lease term without actually rewriting the lease. When it comes to the expiry, we typically try to crystallize that excess rent into a new base rent, and create that as the new base going forward. I expect that 3.5%-4% of NOI to diminish over time as we reset these rents that are midterm, but we will recapture it in terms of base rent. Our CAM, we have a very flexible lease for the most part. People consider malls very expensive to operate, which they can be at times. However, we recover virtually everything we spend from the tenant. Our lease allows us to recover. When we have a capital spend, we treat it very much like a loan. We spend the money, we recover the money from the tenant. Typically, we amortize it. Some of our leases, the Cadillac lease is a great example. It allows us to actually accelerate the amortization earlier, but we charge interest on the money that we spend. So we recover interest income from the tenants. We also charge an administration fee for running the CAM pool. We charge 15%. So in theory, when you are fully occupied and you are recovering all of your cash from the tenants, you can recover up to 115% of your CAM expenditure. That is something we have talked about a lot is our recovery ratios and how they are diminished right now. We do have some malls that have crept over 100% at this time. We expect that to keep marching forward. I think our recovery ratios on average are still in the 80s. We have two malls that right now are at 104%, and it is Lethbridge and Peter Pond in Fort McMurray. They are running at 104%. So we are getting up there with some of our properties as we come full of more occupied. Years ago, I think it was 2017, we kind of bucked the traditional operational position, and we went out and hired an accountant to run our asset management group, basically operations, Graham Procter. Nobody had ever hired an accountant to run this division, but the one thing we recognized is we spend such a significant amount of money on our capital at the properties and recovering it from the tenants, that it was probably best managed by somebody who understand math as opposed to understand how a boiler worked. That is really benefited us in terms of making sure that we are recovering our money and maximizing our returns on what we do spend. Especially leasing revenue, which is a slide at the end. I should have had it moved, but it is a slide at the end. We generate about 5%-7% of our NOI through specialty leasing. 30%-35% of that comes from in-line space, which is space where we are not fully occupied. We will rent out the space that is not occupied. As I mentioned before, we hold that space sometimes for remerchandising. Typically, for remerchandising or periods when we are buying malls that are very much under leased. There is a lot of SL revenue. We also get it from various other sources, whether that be branding. It has changed over time. 30 years ago, you had coin-operated vending machines, you had payphones, you had storage lockers. You had all kinds of things like that. It's transformed over time. We actually make money off Santa now. Santa used to be a cost center. Now it's something we make money off. It used to be a marketing event, now it's really a specialty leasing event. There's all kinds of other things with branding and promotion. There's car shows and such forth. When the in-line space gets leased up, when there's higher vacancy like there is now, our specialty leasing people will turn their attention to other sources of revenue. We've gone through periods when we've been really well occupied, and our SL as a percentage of our NOI has been maintained at 5%-7%. It really hasn't varied over 20 years. It's just a function of their time. Typically, we have one specialty leasing person at every property. They generate, on average, a cost benefit is about 10%. It pays to have somebody dedicated on site. We've tried before to have one person look after multiple sites. While it spreads the cost out, you generally don't generate as much revenue. We felt it was important to have somebody at every site. In terms of marketing's a very important aspect of the property. It was one that was really not managed well for the last 25 years. It's a pool that the tenants pay into, so we're basically spending the tenant money. About 10 years ago, there used to be a landlord contribution. It was typical. It was built into a lot of the anchor leases. With the demise of Target, Sears, and HBC, in fact, I didn't even worry about HBC noticing, we stopped making our landlord contribution, which was a non-recoverable expense. That saved us about CAD 100,000-CAD 150,000 a year. In the last five years, we hired someone specifically to manage marketing. Unlike the past where we hired a marketing person, we actually hired someone to actually manage the money. Marketing people typically spend all the money that you give them at the site, and that's great. Sometimes it's on good promotions, and sometimes it's not money well spent. This person came in to really make sure the money was spent wisely. We've now taken this aspect of our company, and we've turned it into a department where we're able to use the marketing money to do things like sponsor the Canadian Hockey League nationally, and we did that last year. We're a major sponsor. It's driving traffic to our shopping centers. The Memorial Cup last year was in Kelowna. They took the Memorial Cup across Canada to different shopping centers. The hockey players from the various hockey teams that play in the CHL came to our malls, and in some of the communities, the CHL is a big deal, and it drove a lot of traffic to the shopping center, and that's one of the great things about having a national platform and having someone overseeing marketing on a national basis. You can use that money and spread it around and actually drive traffic across the entire portfolio. The other thing about marketing money is marketing money, there's many things you can do with it. Signage in a shopping center, which was typically a recoverable capital item, you can actually call that marketing. There's different aspects to how you use the money, but having somebody manage the money has been very important from our perspective. What I really love about malls is they're like Lego. I've always thought the beauty of a shopping center is you can expand them, you can reduce the size, you can move tenants around. The flexibility is so important for remerchandising, and as I mentioned before, it is so important that we bring in new brands to reinvigorate the mall and keep it fresh for consumers. It's really made possible because the mall is so flexible. You might have a power center where you have a space that's impossible to subdivide. You don't have enough frontage. You have tenants on either side of them with really long lease terms. You're stuck with what you have. In a mall, we have relocation clauses in our leases that allow us to move tenants. In St-Bruno here, we'll talk about it shortly. We're moving the food court. We're able to do that with tenants midterm because we have a relocation clause. Lastly, another source of revenue that we don't talk about very often, we generate about 1% of our NOI from storage rent. When you think about tenants, they have their peaks and valleys in terms of seasons. A lot of them need storage, and they'd like it on site. We'll take dead space, whether that's in a basement or just space that's historically chronically vacant, and we'll lease it out to tenants for storage. There's a tremendous demand for storage, and our rents, I would say in the last 25 years, have crept from, we used to charge CAD 5 and CAD 10 a foot for storage. We're up to CAD 50, CAD 60 a foot for storage now. It's not part of our GLA, and we don't recover CAM and tax necessarily from it. It's just pure rent that goes to our bottom line, and there's no cost associated with it in terms of recovery. That's about 1%. It's held pretty steady at 1% over time. In terms of HBC, we've got a lot of deals. We're right at the finish line. We've got board approval on the majority of our boxes. Conestoga, Orchard Park, Oshawa, Lime Ridge, Galeries de la Capitale, they're all well underway in terms of the construction process, the getting city approvals and such forth. We've got the majority of the space leased. I'd love to be able to stand here and make announcements about tenants, but for the most part, they're all publicly traded companies. Because some of these tenants are relocating from other centers, they don't want to talk about it. They'd rather get further along towards their possession date before their landlord finds out they're actually moving, and their employees find out that they're actually moving as well. There's some tenants that we'll announce and there's some that we won't, but for the most part, we've made tremendous progress. Our rent is going to be significantly higher than HBC. We're still on target with what we've communicated in terms of expenditure. Going back to where I started this whole conversation, it will further enhance the tenant quality and credit quality of our shopping centers. These are all covenant tenants going into our malls. A mall has typically been about 55% anchor, 45% CRU. We are taking CAD 4 rent from HBC, and we are converting it to, on average, CAD 18 or CAD 19 in base rent from the replacement space on a plus or minus 1 million sq ft. That is a tremendous lift in NOI. The majority of that revenue will kick in in 2028 and 2029. It is going to take a while to get the construction going, and then the tenant fit out periods take a while. So that is when the majority of the revenue will kick in. But, everything we see is proceeding as we have talked about. Everything is great in terms of tenant lineups, and leasing progress. We are in really good shape. With that, I really do not have much more to say. I will be happy to take any questions if you have them. Yes. Lights are in my eye. Just on that last point, on HBC, can you just walk through the cadence of the next three years? You said majority weighted to 2028, 2029. What does that mean for 2027? If you had to sort of, I think it is a total 1 million sq ft, if you had to lay out the NOI. Yeah. 2027, so the project we have furthest along right now is Galeries de la Capitale. It has already started. Galeries de la Capitale is basically fully leased. A lot of those tenants will start paying rent later in probably mid to late 2027. There are several restaurants, Fashion Box, L’Imaginaire is taking a large space in the HBC box there as well. The majority of the rest are all going to be turnovers in late 2027 or early 2028. You mentioned the 55% versus 45% percentage. When you think of something like a Walmart, is that not essentially a new type of anchor tenant? What do the rents look like? They are obviously a very powerful firm. Are they different than what you are getting on the CRU? What is the trade-off versus putting more investment to get more CRU in? Yeah, Walmart is an anchor. The overall weighting in the portfolio is not going to change materially just because we've added a Walmart, or a Sport Chek, or any of these replacements. It's still going to be in the 50-ish range. Walmart rents depend on the site they're taking and how badly they wanted it. There's one deal that we're working on right now that we haven't announced yet, where basically it's done, where they're paying a significantly higher rent than they typically do because they really wanted it. It's a relocation of a store. There's others like Place du Royaume, where it's not a really high rent at all. It's a mid-single digit. That was just a function of they saw it as an infill location, but not one they necessarily needed. For the mall itself, it's a tremendous addition for the shopping center. Any other questions? No. Okay, we'll take a quick five-minute break, and we'll be back just before 11:00 A.M. Hello, everyone. Can you please take your seats? Thanks again for joining us today. Greg sends his regrets. He really wanted to be here to present today, and I think it's mostly because after every Investor Day meeting, he complains that he doesn't get to say very much. It's really not because he's a shy guy. It's just because you don't ask many questions about Primaris' financial health. I take that as a compliment, but since I'm here, I'll give you a quick run-through of the differentiated financial model. Primaris was purposefully built with a low FFO payout ratio. Retained cash flow provides long-term compounding benefits for NAV growth and distribution growth. Primaris has increased its distribution every year. It was built to do so, and we intend to continue to do so. When we first spun out, our FFO payout ratio was above our targeted range of 45%-50%. 2023 was 52%, 2024 was 50%, and last year was 47%. We've been able to bring this ratio down while providing modest increases to distributions each year. Now that the payout ratio is within our defined range, we anticipate that future increases will be a little bit bigger than the 2% we've delivered in the past. Retained free cash flow provides us with a flexible pool of capital for distributions, redevelopment, acquisitions, and NCIB activity without having to rely solely on our unsecured revolving credit facility. We're also adding to this cash flow by disposing of some non-core assets. Most importantly, we're applying a disciplined approach to deploying that capital, focusing on long-term value growth for our unitholders without sacrificing the strength of our balance sheet. In addition to our low FFO payout ratio, we also have a low debt to EBITDA ratio. This is tightly tied to our investment-grade credit rating of BBB high, and it's also tied to our executive compensation, two things we care very much about. We're often asked if we would breach our 6 times limit. While the answer's always been no, we don't deny that it's very tempting. Leverage is a double-edged sword. It amplifies the gains in the up periods, but it also amplifies the losses on the downside. It's very easy to increase leverage, but very hard to bring it down. To bring it down, entities are forced to sell some of their best properties or to issue equity in poor market conditions. Our low debt to EBITDA ratio gives us options. It reduces financial risk, supports access to lower cost capital, and provides capacity to act when acquisition opportunities present themselves. It also enhances our resilience in economic cycles, reducing our refinancing risk. When Primaris spun out, we were completely floating rate debt and interest rates were rising. In this environment, we were able to put together a well-laddered unsecured debenture program and provide per-unit growth. Now it looks like we're going to be entering yet another period of rising interest rates. The average interest for the debentures that are maturing in the next 3 years is 5.7%. We put this debt in place back in 2022 and 2023. This was before we completely redeveloped our portfolio and upgraded, and since then, our credit spreads have also narrowed. We actually feel that we're going to have an interest rate tailwind, which will allow us to continue to develop our debt ladder as opposed to focusing on short-term refinancing. We view balance sheet strength as a strategic asset and not just a financing tool. Our approach to managing Primaris' capital structure is to remove risk as much as possible, maintain our investment-grade credit rating, and create flexibility for the business to operate as needed. We focus on preserving our liquidity to take risk out of debt refinancing windows. Our predominantly unsecured debt program allows us to disconnect the right side from the left side of the balance sheet, providing Primaris maximum flexibility to manage and enhance our portfolio without the constraints that are associated with property-level financing. We can make capital allocation decisions based on value creation rather than asset-specific financing constraints. We retain a large pool of unencumbered assets, which provides further financial flexibility. Our low payout ratio, our strong balance sheet, and our low debt to EBITDA are not simply defensive characteristics. These are strategic advantages that help us create value for our unitholders over the long term. With that, I will turn it over to Julian. Thank you. Perfect. I am going to spend most of my time on stage talking to this slide, and this is really to explain how we think through capital allocation and our different sources and uses. Before I dive into them, I want to just first start off by saying our whole capital allocation program is generally done with three goals in mind. Growing our FFO per unit while also strengthening our portfolio quality and risk profile, while also operating within our strategic leverage and distribution guidelines. Leslie had talked about those being the 45%-50% FFO payout ratio that we have and the 5x-6x debt to EBITDA. They are laid out in a certain order here, but I am going to bounce around a little bit of a different order with them. But I want to start off with the free cash flow. As Leslie mentioned, we have got a very balanced payout ratio that allows us to provide an adequate and attractive distribution yield to our unitholders, but gives us a regular cash flow, which is a very low source of capital. It allows us to fund more regular opportunities that are in front of us, whether that is doing out parcel developments, whether that is redeveloping some of our space such as the HBC, and we are not reliant on the capital markets for that. We are past the days where REITs were valued purely on distribution yield and payout ratios were maxed out. There were REITs that were borrowing just to fund the distribution, and I think to a certain extent, there still are. But in our case, we have this regular annual cash flow. This is a very important part of the business that allows us to, again, fund those opportunities without having to be reliant on the markets, and also allows us to be in offense mode in markets that are maybe softer or where capital is not accessible and allows us to be countercyclical, which has been a very key part of the Primaris story. On the debt side, we have got a BBB high rating. We have got a low cost of debt, but we are very cognizant of the trouble that REITs can get into if they go too high. We put a lot of thought into our debt target, which we have narrowed to 5x-6x debt to EBITDA. Then working within that narrow range, we tend to fund off of the unsecured programs. Broadly speaking, we can fund off mortgages, unsecureds or the revolver. On the revolver side of things, that is not meant to be a structural part of the business, but it does give us flexibility. A good example was Upper Canada. We funded CAD 150 million of the CAD 411 million transaction with the revolver. Again, it was not trying to game interest rates or make a call on them, but in this specific transaction we have in our last quarter, we showed CAD 200 million of assets held for sale. While those do not time perfectly with the acquisition, we have a degree of certainty that those are going to materialize such that rather than fund off a bond, we could fund off the revolver knowing that that capital is going to come in. Then as it pertains to mortgages versus unsecureds, right now the unsecured is quite a bit more favorable. You have got a lower cost. It is much easier to arrange. As Rags would mention, you decouple the left and right-hand side of the balance sheet. That is so important because it gives you incredible flexibility for selling or doing land sales or other redevelopments in there. We tend to lean towards the unsecured. We have some mortgages in place, but those are largely for some of the partnerships that we have where our partner needs debt to get to their return targets. Those are important too. You never know what will happen with the unsecured market. It can be cyclical and having those relationships with those secured lenders provides a benefit as well. Land sales is another one that I would say is somewhat new to Primaris and largely off of the HBC bankruptcy that has freed up some of the land to now be sold. What we really like about this is it is a zero cost source of capital. We are well underway on that, and I am going to talk about that a little bit more on the next slide. It is land that we are not really using. As you saw when we were driving by, oftentimes it is pieces of grass that are outside of the ring road, no NOI being lost. In some cases, we are actually saving costs of landscaping, snow removal, property tax, that type of thing. They come with long timelines, high degree of risk, and they are going to be more bite-sized. We are well underway, which I will elaborate more on, and eventually it is going to be just kind of a regular small source of free capital coming in. Another benefit I will mention is it really demonstrates the value of the portfolio and how irreplaceable it is, which I will touch on more. Above that, the larger chunkier sources of capital are the asset dispositions and equity offerings. Those are more so being used to improve the portfolio, but also fund larger acquisitions. I will talk to the asset dispositions first. We are looking to sell non-core assets, and so typically by definition, that is your highest cost of capital. So you are selling equity interests in your kind of lowest quality assets. That should be the highest source, and it historically has been. For us, it is more so our outlook for the future. Where are we going to see growth? You heard a lot about tenants being in expansion mode, but being selective with where they want to be. For us, the dispositions are really focused on malls where we do not think there is a strong growth outlook in the future, largely because maybe it is a smaller center, lower traffic center, or in markets that we do not see strong fundamentals or growth in. Again, that should in theory, be the highest cost and has been the highest cost of capital. I do not want to get too ahead of ourselves, but we are seeing a lot of strong demand. We ran a process in the summer which had really, really impressive demand, and we are having a lot of discussions with buyers. With all the shakeup that is going on in many asset classes, negative leverage, low returns, a lot of real estate allocators are seeing the mall as one of the few asset classes where you can get outsized returns. We are seeing a lot of capital starting to build up around the mall space and a lack of supply. I would not be too surprised if you saw us in the future being able to sell some of our lowest tier malls at cap rates that might even be inside of where the overall better quality, more liquid portfolio is trading at right now around an approximately 8% cap rate. I think that is a really fantastic dynamic that hopefully we will be able to demonstrate. We are also looking at some of the outparcels as well. This is, Pat showed you when we were driving around, stuff that is outside of the ring road. Good investment and good retail, but it is not really core to our business. Our platform, our cost of capital, our expertise are really centered around the enclosed shopping center. If we can tactically sell off some of these outparcels at cap rates that are meaningfully tighter and for stuff that is non-core and take advantage of the really strong interest for that open air retail and also the different buyer pool. It is sometimes private buyers that have a very different philosophy and are not focused on the same return metrics that we are. We think that is a really tactical one. Mark Sinnett, who is with us, is going to be launching the outparcels here this month. We think there will be incredibly strong demand, and it will show that while we buy these malls at higher IRRs, we can sell some of the non-core, less important stuff at meaningfully tighter ones, and that can be a really good source of capital. Another place where we are looking at it as well is some of the malls that we are looking to sell that we are deeming non-core, they come with outparcels as well. The buyers of the malls, the cap rates are coming in, but they are still wider than the outparcels. The larger you go, the more that buyer pool falls off. In some cases where we have larger malls where the ticket size might prohibit some of the private investors, we are going to sever those outparcels, sell those at meaningfully tighter cap rates, and then the remaining non-core mall will be smaller and should price tighter, simply by virtue of being able to attract more competition in the bidding side. The last major source that I will talk through is equity offerings. That is one we take incredibly serious. We are sharing in ownership of our company. Our management team owns a meaningful amount in the stock, so we do not do it lightly. It is something we are very, very cautious about. Generally speaking, it is something we will only do to fund a very strategic acquisition. The most recent example, of course, is Upper Canada Mall. We have done it with all the large acquisitions as well. We can do it to the public markets. We can do it to the vendors. We were now able to do it public because of where it is trading. It does not mean that issuing to the vendors is off the table. It is simply another tool in our tool belt. The way we think through that, notwithstanding that we think the equity is a very good investment, it was something that was needed to be able to capitalize on the opportunity that was Upper Canada. To talk very briefly on that, again, that was a low 7 cap, which is tighter than where our cap rate is. But it was accretive on day one partly because there is no incremental G&A load with it. So you have to factor that in when you are comparing our implied cap rate versus the cap rate we are buying at. But importantly, that was a center with 70% vacancy in the GTA with lots of upside. We see a clear path to it, and we are not paying for the upside; that was not factored in. It is immediately modestly accretive, but what is really exciting is where the future is. Again, we do not rely on buying it for where the future will be 2-3 years from now. We are happy with where it is at now, but we are just very excited for that. I always say be wary of REITs that will tell you, "We are really buying it off of year 3." In our case, we are completely fine with where it is at now, but Primaris has a very strong track record. We talked about it in Halifax, how that was bought at a high 6 cap rate. It is now, based on the NOI, we have an implied close to a 9, and we will be north of a 10 after the sales of the annex and the land. We do have a track record of doing that. We will issue equity in order to get those types of acquisitions that improve portfolio quality, FFO, and future growth. Let me pivot a little bit to the uses. Again, I am going to bounce around on the orders here. Distribution to unitholders, that is something that is baked in with the 45%-50%. Again, it is done with an aim of providing an adequate or attractive yield to our unitholders and leaving behind enough cash. I already kind of touched on that, so I will not go too much more into that. But one part of that is that is very stable, it is recurring, it is baked in there in a world where we are seeing distribution cuts throughout. This is done with the goal that it will never go down, and we have an annual cadence of increasing it, and that will always be part of it. Debt repayment, we have a narrow band that we mentioned there. Again, the difference between the cost of debt and the IRRs is quite strong. Debt repayment is not a huge part. We just want to operate within 5-6. You will see us sometimes lower it in advance to give us flexibility for redeployment later. But we are happy with the targets we have set. Redevelopments and expansion, this is investing in our own portfolio, and this is one of the lowest risk, highest return ones. We do it tactically. We want to be careful. We would not want to add too much retail and oversaturate a mall. But where we do do it, whether it be HBC, putting up bank pads or restaurants, we typically target yields that are over 10%. We typically do it with leases in hand, so it is quite de-risked. We have got a construction team that knows very well what they are doing, and this is kind of what they live and breathe. We are not going to be building master plans or apartments or anything. We have seen enough of our peers get in trouble with that. It is really just kind of small, within our snack bracket, high yielding stuff that makes good sense on the math on its own and also just adds to the mall's quality and experience. Share buyback, that has been less of a part of the story right now. It does not mean it is turned off. We still think the shares make a wonderful investment. To be able to, again, in light of being able to potentially be selling some of our lower quality assets at cap rates that are tighter than are implied with less growth, it speaks to how attractive the share buyback is on our end. But we have to manage that with strategic acquisition opportunities, our debt profile. But we have been one of a very active REIT on that front, and that will continue to be a tool that we can use in the right opportunities. Asset acquisitions, again, I did touch on that again. The goal with those is we are buying ones where we are improving our portfolio overall in terms of quality, whether that is through long-term growth, whether that is through higher traffic, higher sales, productivity, exposure to major markets. The main idea is we want to buy stuff that 5 years from now, and similar to what we say with Conestoga and Halifax, everyone is going to be saying, "What a great deal that was. What an amazing investment that was." We think Upper Canada fits squarely in that, and we are going to continue to look at opportunities like that. So, diving a little bit more into the land. We published this in June. We went through the entire portfolio. Our 25 malls, which is soon to be 26 later this month. The typical size of our mall is about 50 acres. We have got typically between 25%-30% site coverage, and so there is a whole bunch of other restrictions that are in place, but we came to around 120 acres of land with value of CAD 275 million-CAD 375 million. We again view that as a very low cost of capital, and in many cases, not only does it not have any harm to the mall by selling it, but actually it even helps the mall by bringing additional traffic. We are not just looking at multi-res. I think people think because of my background that we are going to be heavily focused on multi-res, but we are actually talking to everyone. We talk to hotel users, student housing, we are talking to the seniors housing, long-term care, even self-storage in some cases. We are really looking across asset classes, and we do think it will help support the mall. We are not going to be, again, doing these crazy master plans that will be ripping up the parking lots and making a concrete jungle where you can barely see the mall. By and large, it is stuff outside of the ring road, so not disruptive to the mall, and that is where we are focusing first and where we will just be adding kind of traffic and customers. So, I want to give a tiny update. These do take quite a bit of time. Oftentimes, they are tied to rezonings. Development is extremely fickle. It is very levered. You've got a huge amount that you have to spend to build and a huge amount of value, and a small tweak in assumptions can kind of make your residual land value go away. All that's to say, it will take time, and there is some degree of execution risk, but we've got one under APS that's waived conditions, two under APS that we're working through the due diligence. We've got one under LOI that hopefully we'll have under APS very soon. Then we're negotiating three other LOIs. We're well underway. It's exciting, and we actually got. I'm not going to give too many details on it, but we got one unsolicited offer on one site that we know is a gem, but it's not GTA or Montréal or anything, but there's something special about the site. The offer said, "I'll take as much as I can get," and the value per acre of land on that site, if you applied that to the entire mall, the value would be twice what we have the mall on our IFRS value. This is, I would say, a semi non-core mall, and so it really speaks to the value of the land bank that is not given any value, and even further, I'll say it speaks to the replacement cost. When the land in that site specific, and that's not typical that it's that strong, but when the land is worth twice as much as the mall, it really shows you, A, how hard it's going to be to amass that type of scale of land, but you can never really replace it. That's one of the really strong moats around the business. Give us a bit more time, and we'll have more and more updates, and eventually, you're going to start seeing a cadence of just free cash flow kind of pumping back in the business that we can reinvest in our strong opportunities. I'm going to talk more specifically about this mall. I've just got two more slides. One of them is on the outparcels. Mark talked about it yesterday, and Patrick pointed them out as he was driving through. There's a Tesla dealership, and then there's some other outparcels. You've got Best Buy, Old Navy, La Cage, a few other tenants in there. This is subject to a lot of demand. Mark said there's not enough supply out there. Investors are very hungry for this. You can underwrite with incredibly strong fundamentals that we may not even believe in ourselves, and they're smaller in size, so they draw a much broader capital pool than pretty much, I think, almost any other asset class right now. You might even say that they might be somewhat overvalued. If it's not core to us, it's not part of what the platform is directed to do, it makes for a really good opportunity to sell. We've got a lot of those. We're excited about this one. We've been working with Mark's team over the last couple of months, and we're going to be launching that this fall. Given the simplicity and smaller size of that shouldn't be too controversial of a process and should be able to sell and really show that when we buy these malls, we don't ascribe a separate value to the outparcels. We value them with the same high IRRs that we're using for our malls. But then if we can flip and sell those for lower, and we talked about the annex at Halifax, for those of you that were there, it's a very similar story. We'll take advantage of that. The last piece is the land. We're sitting on over 100 acres of land here. St-Bruno is an affluent area in the South Shore. It's exciting, and we've got a lot of land on the outparcels. The first area that we're going to be targeting is going to be what we've got highlighted in green here on the screen. That's the grassy area that Pat was pointing to. So there is no other use for us with that. With the proximity to the highways, the highly affluent area, the brand-new airport that just opened, and the best mall in the South Shore, this is as good as it gets for land in the South Shore, and it's very attractive. I'm out talking to all different developers of all different asset classes across the country, and what I will say is this one right now is the one I get the most questions about. There's a lot of interest. The seniors housing folks love it because of the demographics, the affluent, and older population. The hotel folks love it because of the new airport that just opened. There couldn't be a better spot. You're by the highway, you're by the airport, and you've got all the shopping and retail in there, especially the Keg one, right? So you think for a hotel developer, they don't have to build out or operate a restaurant. You've got a perfect hotel restaurant beside it as well. The multi-res folks are quite interested in it as well. So a bit of a frustrating one. The reason this one's not front of the line in terms of the list that I was kind of walking through in APS and LOIs is the municipality has expressed that they want to see more density here, and that's very encouraging, and we think either they're going to rezone it for us, or they will facilitate rezoning that we would do on our end. But as great as that sounds, they said, "Okay, well, we got to sit down and think about this, and we're going to come out with a project charter that outlines the uses and the densities. By the way, you're frozen from selling anything until we do that." Since I joined over six months ago, it's been coming in two to three weeks. Pretty much that's the update we get every two to three weeks. They've said it's coming this month, we mean it for real, but I'll see it when I believe it. Once we have that, it'll allow us to go to developers and say, "Look, this is what you can do with this. The city is supportive. There's a clear path to it," and we've got a long line. This is one I get asked quite a bit about, so that'll be very exciting for us. I've outlined, call it approximately 7 acres that would be really easy to sell, that's grass, that's outside of the ring road, and working with Mark Sinnett and another land broker, Daniel Garon, who specializes in this. We've talked about what we're going to do. We've walked through values. I think CAD 4 million an acre would be not controversial at all to say. On 7 acres, you're talking plus or minus 28. I'll go even further than that. We haven't outlined it, but there's more land outside of the ring road. You can see the red dotted lines is what we own. There's quite a bit more that we could do outside of the ring road. That'll have a little bit more complications, which is why it's not first. Even within the ring roads, whenever we run out, if there are areas that aren't disruptive to the mall, we would consider that. We take piercing the ring road a little bit more seriously, so that's kind of the last line of opportunity. Again, all of that value was something we didn't pay for. With that said, I'm going to pass it back off to Alex Avery. Thank you, Julian Schonfeldt. One thing I forgot to do when I first came up here at the beginning was Pierrick Picour is the marketing manager here at Promenades St-Bruno. He's in the back. He joined us six or 8 months ago from the Montreal Alouettes, so lots of diverse marketing experience, and I would highly recommend you chat him up as we walk around the mall because he has lots of interesting stuff that's going on at this shopping center. This is going to be shorter than my earlier ramble, and it's going to be just about what we've been talking about. This is management's focus, and if you just look through those four different buckets, that's really what myself and Pat Sullivan and Leslie Buist and Julian Schonfeldt have been talking about. Maintaining financial strength, allocating capital with discipline, driving NOI within the existing portfolio, and growing FFO and AFFO and distributions per unit. I think we've mentioned a few times, we've been very thoughtful about our executive compensation, creating alignment between our management team and unitholders. I think Julian Schonfeldt mentioned there's a lot of the executive personal net wealth tied up in Primaris. We're very aligned with unitholders, and so this is the stuff that we're focused on. When I think about the future of Primaris, and I think that the team thinks about it this way as well, our June 29th press release spoke to the lease-up of a lot of the HBC, but also the CRU leasing that we've been doing. A lot of that CRU leasing was from legacy portfolios, but a lot of it was from properties that we have acquired over the last few years, leasing up vacant space. Still some remnants of the pandemic in terms of legacy vacancy within the portfolio. I think Pammi had asked earlier about the timing of the HBC rents commencing. That will be, as Pat was saying, late 2027, 2028. A lot of the CRU leasing that we have been reporting on, particularly in Q1 of this year, a lot of that is going to be sort of filling some of that gap through 2027. Those leases typically take less time to build out the space, and they tend to be at higher rents. Our ramp of growth, even in 2026, if you look at our same property NOI growth in the first half, we are expecting it to pick up in the second half, as is implied in our guidance for 2026, and we will see that ramp go through 2027, 2028, 2029. As we think about the next phase of our growth, once we get to 96%, 97%, the growth will come from a different source, but we are pretty optimistic about the scale of that growth. For the last few years, as we have been filling space, there are a number of tenants within our portfolio that we have allowed to persist. Some of them are not terribly productive, or they do not pay very much rent, but they were filling space, and as we were trying to fill the space beside them, we let that be. When our shopping centers are full, every tenant has to fight for their space, and that means they need to be more relevant for consumers. They need to pay higher rent. They need to sell more stuff. Once we get the malls full, the next phase of growth is really around going back and optimizing the tenant mix, which is something we do on an ongoing basis, but there have been a number of retailers that we have let sort of persist in the portfolio. That really, I say 2029, 2032, but when you think about when that is actually going to happen, the full tenancy that we are talking about in the June 29th press release and in this slide, most of that will contractually be done in the next 12, 18, 24 months. As soon as we get to that committed 96%, is when you start to work on the tenant optimization. A lot of that work will be even in the latter half of 2027, and a lot of it will be in 2028. Then the operational efficiency side of things. I think it is fair to say that when you have got a portfolio that is 70% new in the last five years, including CAD 1 billion and CAD 1.6 billion of acquisitions in 2025, another CAD 400 million that we just announced, we are still wrapping our arms around a lot of these properties. Sometimes it takes a little bit of time to figure out exactly what you have and where you can take it. As our business has been very fluid and dynamic in terms of the portfolio construction, there is a lot of opportunity in operational efficiency. Some of it comes back to AI and the optimization of some of our processes. Other things, our lease structures. We have a group of people in our lease administration group that basically calculate the recoveries from all of the tenants. I think we can utilize some technology, some AI to improve the efficiency there. That group sort of shifts its focus from the rote calculation of the recoveries. All 3,000 tenants have a slightly different calculation of that recovery. As you can better wrap your arms around exactly how all those calculations are done and utilize technology, you can also analyze that portfolio of leases and figure out ways that you can feed back to the legal team to say, "When we're writing these leases, this is a little tweak that the tenant doesn't really care about, but it'll improve our operating margin. It'll improve our efficiency." There's a dozen different things along that line. That's something that from a platform perspective, we're really excited about being the next phase of growth for Primaris. I mentioned earlier that we have a new set of three-year targets out, 96% in place occupancy. That is what our prior target was before we revised it due to the HBC bankruptcy. Interestingly enough, if you exclude the HBC space, we're at 96% committed. We'd like to get the in place back up to that level as well. We think over the next three years, 2027, 2028, and 2029, we've got a 3%-5% same property NOI growth range. I think that's sort of a compound annual growth rate. We're not exactly sure where it's going to land in each year, but it has the potential to exceed the top end of that range in some years, and we think that the average will be somewhere in that range. Dispositions, CAD 500 million. Julian just spoke about some of the land and out parcels. We do have some non-core malls as well that we'll be selling as well. Hopefully, some of that news will be available in the near term. Capital expenditures, we've got CAD 200 million-ish around the HBC, and then there's another CAD 100 million of projects, which once we wrap up the webcast portion of this Investor Day, Pat's going to speak to some of the projects that we have going on in this mall. There's a CAD 50 million project that's not HBC related that will go into that CAD 300 million just here at this property. FFO growth 4%-8%. As Leslie was mentioning, our payout ratio has dropped into the below midpoint of our target range, and our FFO growth, we believe, is accelerating over the next three years, and so we're expecting distribution increases in the 4%-8% range as well. That's up from the 2% to 2.5% that we've been doing for the last four or five years. Leverage, we tightened up the bottom end of the range. This isn't terribly strategic. It's just sort of an acknowledgment from us that what we've really been doing when we think about the last five years is we've been trying to optimize the amount of equity in the business. Dropping leverage to four times doesn't really add a lot of advantage over five times, and we are comfortable with our six times ceiling. In practical reality, we've really been optimizing for that 5.5-6 range, really, but we're comfortable going down to 5. The payout ratio remains unchanged. One thing you'll note about this is we don't have a target on acquisitions, and that's not to say that there has been any change in our ambition or our opportunity set. We still remain very focused on acquiring malls that we think elevate our platform, in terms of the quality, the internal growth rate of the steady state, same property NOI growth. It just is a very difficult thing to handicap because the acquisitions are CAD 400 million, CAD 500 million, CAD 600 million. When we do four acquisitions like we did in 2025, it's CAD 1.6 billion. We've got one so far this year at CAD 400 million. We're not super focused on growing specifically to grow. It's really about getting the right properties. We think that there's a significant opportunity there, but we just decided not to put out a specific target because it's just a tough one to wrap your arms around. We do remain very interested, and we're in active discussions on a number of properties. That is a really good quote. I'm not sure who it's attributed to, but that's probably a collective Primaris team quote. We're pretty excited about what lies ahead. I hope everyone has found this very useful and productive, and we're looking forward to touring everyone through the mall after we have some lunch. We have a little bit of time right now for some Q&A, and it can be for myself, it can be for Leslie, for Julian, for Pat. Any questions that anyone has, we'd be happy to field at this point. Alex, the CAD 500 million disposition target, you had the same target three years ago. Are these assets that you always wanted to sell? I assume they're not from assets you recently bought, so it's just continuing to trim from lower quality, lower sales? Yes. The non-core dispositions is a combination of the land, which as Julian very clearly mentioned, has essentially no cost of capital for us. We do have some out parcels which aren't strategic to us. When it comes to the malls, again, what we're really trying to optimize for is the steady state internal growth rate. We have some malls in our portfolio that are very good, steady performers. What we're really trying to do is optimize around the high growth part of the portfolio. Embedded in your question was, are these the same ones that we've always been looking at? I would say, as our portfolio has grown and the averages that we spoke about earlier have improved, that line for non-core tends to move up a little bit. As I mentioned a couple of minutes ago, hopefully we'll have some news on that front in the quite near future. You'll see some of the examples that would be non-core. Hey, Alex. It's Sam. Sam. How's it going? Great presentation. Thank you for doing this today. Look forward to seeing the mall. I just want to understand what's in the same property and a wide growth guidance of 3%-5%. This might be for Leslie, but clearly it's 96% occupancy is where you're targeting over the next, I guess, 3 years. What properties are in and not in that same property asset pool in terms of maybe some recent acquisitions that might not be part of that. Also, you've talked in the past about getting to a mid-90s recovery ratio. Is that embedded in your 2029 target at this point and included in the same property NOI growth guidance? Yeah. Leslie, on the same property, would the 2025 acquisitions be in our 2027? Yes. Next year, everything we bought in 2025 will be in 2027. That will mean St-Bruno and Upper Canada will be the only ones that aren't same property next year, and then St-Bruno steps in, and then Upper Canada steps in. Yes, we would consider the growth in the recoveries as part of our same property growth predictions as well. Really, it's only Upper Canada Mall that won't be in the same property for 2027. But after that, everything else is in. Your recovery ratio question, on that point, one of the things that we found there's been a little bit of confusion about is when we talk about the drivers of same property NOI growth, lease-up is a big driver. We've also talked about the recovery ratios going up as being a driver, but those two are really overlapping. As the occupancy goes up, the recovery ratio improves. I would say absolutely, we're expecting our recovery ratio to get into the low to mid 90s for property taxes, and ideally the mid 90s to even the high 90s for the CAM. The CAM, we can charge an administrative fee, which gives us the possibility to be over 100%. I think Pat said that Peter Pond and Park Place have both been at 104, both very well-run shopping centers. We're hopeful that we'll be able to get the whole portfolio up into that mid 90s blended recovery ratio. Yeah, Alex. Maybe just to follow up on that same property NOI question, just to clarify, is the HBC backfill included in that figure when you're also, of course, putting in a fair amount of CapEx? I just want to make sure that the HBC space is part of that 3-5. Yeah. Yeah. No, it is. I think it's a good question, in the sense that there's a lot of ways that you can drive same property NOI growth. If you wanted to buy up your rents, you can spend capital to manufacture same property NOI growth. In our case, we try to be as transparent as possible. The capital that we're spending, we're calculating the return based on the space being empty. The 10% or 10%+ yields that we're getting on the HBC backfill is just the incremental cost and the gross rent that we're getting. That will be included in the same property. Ideally, if we're successful on everything that we're doing, hopefully we'll be at the top end of the range or possibly above the top end of the range, which for those who have followed us for a while, we tend to like to set targets that we're reasonably confident that we can hit. 3-5 is a number that we're quite comfortable that we'll be able to achieve, and it's possible we could outperform. Just to follow up, that 4%-8% FFO growth that you've laid out, there's clearly a number of moving parts here, between 3% and 5% same property NOI, the CAD 500 million in disposition, depending on what yield versus land or an asset or an income producing asset. When you think about that 4%-8%, is it more skewed to, I guess, some of the heavier leasing or benefit from a leasing standpoint on the backfill of that space? I think that CAD 50 million of NOI that you showed kind of shows it kind of evenly over the next three years. Just trying to reconcile that range of 4%-8% and what that might look like in the later years versus the early years. Yeah. At the end of this month, we're going to provide our 2027 guidance, and that will give us more specific numbers around 2027. At this point, we're still working on the three-year budget and where all of those things land. I tried to touch on it earlier, but the contributions in 2027 are more likely to be skewed towards the CRU leasing. There's been record levels of CRU leasing in our portfolio. In one of Pat's slides, it showed the volume of leasing really accelerating. That's not just because the portfolio's larger, it is on a comparable basis, has been accelerating quite a bit. As it relates to the FFO per unit growth, I think you touched on the key variables. Dispositions. The dispositions, there's no real two ways about it. When you are selling something at a high single-digit cap rate and the use is paying down debt or something else, it is going to be dilutive. Fortunately, these properties are smaller in CAD dollar value than the acquisitions that we are making. There is a negative spread. The things that we are selling are typically slightly higher cap rate than the things that we are buying. But on the whole, we think that we are generating higher internal growth and it is really a timing difference. But, yeah, to get to the 4% would imply a fair bit of dilution from dispositions and probably a lack of success on some of the leasing that we think we are pretty well advanced on. The high end of the range would be some outperformance from some of the acquisitions, some earlier delivery of the rent from some of the CRU leasing, but also the HBC backfill leasing. 4%-8% we feel is a pretty comfortable range and again, if things go really well, possibly we will be above that range. Hey, Alex. We were out in Halifax, and that mall is fully occupied, and there is a mark to market on rent story there. You have malls that are in various rates of lease-up, but just given the replacement cost and the rents that are necessary to occupy new space, do you expect to see a market rent move while you are leasing up this space, or do you need to get to that 96% occupancy before you have tension and can push rents? I do not know. Maybe Pat wants to answer that one. I think probably yes, but I will let Yes. Yeah. Rents will move up. There's a lot of demand for space. Halifax is a good example. We have a ton of tenants that want more space, existing tenants that want to expand. We're going to be replacing some existing tenants in the mall that aren't performing and bringing in new tenants or expanding existing ones, and the rents are just going to climb. Yeah. One of the things that's unique about the mall business is that the rents aren't necessarily location specific, they're tenant specific. One of the metrics that we always encourage people to look at is our gross rent occupancy cost ratio, and it's at 12.5%. We think we can get it up to the 14.5% range, recognizing that that's a gross rent metric. If you eliminate the additional rent component, you're really talking about 200 basis points of increase on 600, 650 basis points of net rent. So the mark to market that we believe exists in our portfolio is somewhere in that 25%-30% range. It takes some time, leasing up space is a priority over the leasing spreads right now. But 12, 18 months from now, when we've done all of the committed leasing to get to 96 is when we really start to dig into that. That's pushing the rents on existing tenants we want to keep, but also replacing some of the softer performing tenants. Is that Lorne? Thank you. Maybe I'll put Pat back on the spot since he had an easy out last time. With the increase in costs of financing, are you seeing any slowdown in terms of appetite for retailers to continue to expand? It's not financing that's causing them anxiety, it's construction costs. Mic, closer to your mouth. Okay. It's really construction costs that are hitting retailers right now. It's the cost to build, whether they're box stores like grocery stores or just tenant fit outs. They're trying to figure out how to optimize their layout so they can get costs down. Having said that, it hasn't slowed down expansion, but it's certainly they're starting to talk about more. Can I go? Thanks. My question is, how much of the FFO per unit growth guidance is from the sale of residential density? In other words, what would the 4%-8% target be if you sold zero excess land? Honestly, I believe that our modeling has not really incorporated much on that front. We tend to be fairly conservative, and as Julian has highlighted, it is a complicated process. Julian's only been with us for six months. He brings all of the expertise in this realm, and we're giving him a little bit of leeway until it actually comes through. The numbers are not that huge, so it's incremental. It is free capital, essentially, in terms of the cost of capital. I would say that's kind of a bonus to the extent that we are successful on that front and we redeploy it. Just when you think about our weighted average cost of capital across our CAD 5 billion of equity and debt, it's a relatively small number, but it really does help, and particularly over time. We think it's going to be a significant driver, but to date, we haven't really factored that into our forecast. Thank you. Alex, I noticed that you've had a chart on M&A targets in your presentations in some of the past ones. I can appreciate that you don't have a target on acquisitions. When you think about your opportunity set for malls that would fit your criteria, what does that number look like? Is it another CAD 3 billion? Is it CAD 4 billion? Well, since the beginning, we've had a chart that said 40 or 50 billion. We've acquired CAD 3.8 billion in the last five years. There's still an awful lot out there. To give you some context or some qualitative description, there are a diversity of perspectives at the pension plan. Some of them are quite keen to get entirely out of direct real estate. Some of them have platforms and want to maintain that platform, and it's more a matter of rebalancing the mix of office, retail, industrial, cell towers, data centers, infrastructure, other real assets. I would say that we've acquired a fair bit. I would say that the opportunity set is still well in excess of what we've acquired to date. We have some more stuff that we're working on. You never know until you know, but we're optimistic that we'll be able to continue to add high-quality shopping centers to the portfolio. It's possible in the remainder of 2026. I think we'll be active in 2027, and I'm getting more confident that even 2028 will continue to have some significant opportunities. It's a very interesting landscape. The malls that we acquire are large. Canada is not that large of a place, and so the liquidity in the mall market remains not anywhere near what it would be, for instance, grocery anchored strips, where you can have an auction and have 30 or 40 bidders that are well-qualified, that are aggressive. Julian Schonfeldt has spoken, I think he spoke about it as well in Halifax. Our most recent acquisition, there was more competition that we've run into than we have in the past, which we believe is encouraging, but we still remain a preferred buyer, particularly as you get larger and larger, CAD 400 million and plus. We have a great profile, excellent access to capital, no financing condition. We're very professional. Our team underwrites these properties very quickly. We can communicate very clearly with the vendors, and we have established great relationships with all of these counterparties, and we work very well with them. We're quite optimistic that there's still a long way to go. Thank you.